储能科学与技术

• XXXX •    

基于改进Shapley值与主从博弈的共享储能-充换电站协同运行策略

成章(), 于艾清(), 王育飞, 薛花, 李兴壮   

  1. 上海电力大学电气工程学院,上海 200090
  • 收稿日期:2025-09-09 修回日期:2025-10-14
  • 通讯作者: 于艾清 E-mail:cheng935201@163.com;yuaiqing@shiep.edu.cn
  • 作者简介:成章 (2000—),男,硕士研究生,研究方向为储能容量配置与运行优化,E-mail:cheng935201@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    上海市自然科学基金(23ZR1425000);上海市科技创新行动计划项目(22010501400)

Based on the improved Shapley value and master-slave game, the cooperative operation strategy of shared energy storage-charging and swapping station is proposed

Zhang CHENG(), Aiqing YU(), Yufei WANG, Hua XUE, Xingzhuang LI   

  1. School of Electric Power Engineering, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai 200090, China
  • Received:2025-09-09 Revised:2025-10-14
  • Contact: Aiqing YU E-mail:cheng935201@163.com;yuaiqing@shiep.edu.cn

摘要:

随着新能源发电渗透率的不断提升,电网面临源荷时空错配加剧、灵活性资源不足等挑战,共享储能作为平抑波动、提升消纳能力的关键手段,已成为重要解决方案。然而,传统共享储能模式依赖运营商独立投资建设,储能运营商面临初始投资成本高、利用率低等问题。随着电动汽车行业的发展与普及,配备储能资源的电动汽车充换电站的规模也持续扩大。为此,提出一种基于混合博弈架构的共享储能协同优化策略,共享储能运营商通过自建储能以及整合充换电站中的闲置储能资源,构建“自建+合作”双模式储能系统。上层模型中,共享储能运营商与充换电站通过合作博弈形成资源联盟,提出改进Shapley值分配机制,综合考虑计及运行商决策的容量贡献度、负荷-储能匹配度及成本分担因子,并引入熵权法动态调整权重系数,实现联盟收益的公平分配;下层,构建主从博弈模型,以储能运营商为领导者制定分时服务定价策略,引导光伏社区优化用电行为。仿真结果表明:相较于传统储能运营商自建储能模式,所提运营商“自建+合作” 双模式储能系统的投资成本降低27.53%,用户用储成本降低17.62%,且改进Shapley值分配后基尼系数由0.32降低至0.21,显著提升合作公平性。

关键词: 共享储能, 充换电站, 合作博弈, 主从博弈, 改进Shapley值

Abstract:

As the penetration rate of renewable energy generation continues to grow, power grids are confronted with increasingly complex challenges, including significant spatio-temporal mismatches between supply and demand and a critical shortage of flexible regulation resources. As a critical solution to mitigate fluctuations and enhance renewable energy utilization, shared energy storage has emerged as a key strategy. However, traditional shared energy storage models depend on independent investment and construction by operators, leading to high initial capital costs and low resource utilization rates. Driven by the rapid development and widespread adoption of electric vehicles (EVs), the scale of EV charging and battery swapping stations equipped with energy storage resources has expanded continuously. To address these challenges, a collaborative optimization strategy based on a hybrid game-theoretic framework for shared energy storage is proposed. By integrating self-built energy storage systems and aggregating idle storage resources from EV charging/swapping stations, a "self-built + cooperative" dual-source energy storage system is established. At the upper level, a cooperative game model is formed between the shared energy storage operator and the charging/swapping stations, where an improved Shapley value allocation mechanism is introduced. This mechanism comprehensively considers factors including capacity contribution, load-storage matching degree, and cost-sharing, with entropy weight coefficients dynamically adjusted to achieve fair revenue distribution. At the lower level, a Stackelberg game model is constructed, where the energy storage operator (as the leader) formulates time-of-use service pricing strategies to guide prosumers to optimize electricity utilization. Simulation results indicate that compared to traditional self-built energy storage models, the proposed dual-source energy storage system reduces investment costs by 27.53% and lowers prosumers' energy costs by 17.62%. Additionally, the Gini coefficient for fairness improves from 0.32 to 0.21 under the modified Shapley value allocation, demonstrating significantly enhanced equity in cooperative revenue distribution.

Key words: shared energy storage, battery swapping station, cooperative game, stackelberg game, improved Shapley value